In this paper we estimate a dynamic model where consumers are searching for the best good and learning about the price-quality relationship in the Bayesian fashion. Thereby we relax one of the critical assumptions made in the existing studies on empirics of search: that consumers know the distribution o¤ers and therefore do not take into account the information collected during the search process. Besides being more realistic, the assumption of learning allows to make an inference about consumer's prior beliefs from his search decisions: the variation of posterior beliefs among consumers can explain these decisions in a way that is complementary to variation in search costs. We estimate models with and without learning on a unique dataset of search histories by consumers booking a hotel online. A statistical test between the two models shows that the data favors the learning hypothesis. We also …nd an evidence that consumers underestimate the price of quality, relative to the price regression.
Introduction
The basic motivation behind the costly search is the lack of information by the consumers about available goods and their prices. As a result of the incomplete information, every search attempt brings an uncertain outcome, which by itself contains a possibility of improving the status quo. In economic models of search, this uncertainty is formalized as a random draw from some distribution of o¤ers. The question is then whether the consumer knows the distribution of o¤ers itself. One part of the literature on the topic, beginning with Stigler (1961) and probably even earlier, has taken a simpler approach that the consumer knows this distribution. Such assumption leads to an elegant and intuitive characterization of an optimal behavior, based on a single reservation utility. Another tradition, beginning with Rothschild (1974) argues that this is an unrealistic assumption. First, if prices are changing together with market conditions, their distribution is likely to change as well. Second, even if the equilibrium distribution of prices were stationary, consumers must have a signi…cant experience with this market before they get a precise idea about this distribution. While this may be an adequate approximation when it comes to frequently purchased products (such as laundry detergents), in many other markets it is not.
To these arguments we add an observation that the model of search from known distribution actually makes two assumptions about consumer beliefs. It not only assumes that consumers are certain about the distribution they are searching from, it also postulates that it is the equilibrium price distribution. Consequently, studies on product search assume that consumers know the empirical pdf of prices, while labor search papers use this assumption to explain wage dispersion. Essentially, this is an easy way to solve a di¢ cult problem: we really don't know what consumers believe. Unfortunately, this solution is no always adequate. Indeed, a robust …nding from studies on consumer shopping behavior is a highly skewed distribution of length of search: there is a signi…cant part of consumers who perform little or not search. At the same time, data exhibits signi…cant degree of price variation, suggesting potential gains from search. See papers by Johnson et al (2004) , de los Santos (2008) , and this study for a supporting evidence. A striking example is the mortgage market: in a recent paper, Hall and Woodward (2009) show that a sizeable part of borrowers overpay their brokers very signi…cant sums of money because they do not consult other sources (friends, experts, other brokers). The model of search from known distribution can only explain this behavior by implausibly high search costs, in the order of thousands of dollars. We think a better explanation is that consumers hold private beliefs 1 about pro…tability of search that are not derived from the actual price distribution. However, testing between these explanations is a challenge, because we observe neither search costs nor beliefs.
In this paper, we suggest an identi…cation strategy, based on consumer learning about the distribution of o¤ers 2 , that can be used to separately estimate prior beliefs and search cost distribution from the search data. The idea is that while the search cost is constant over search attempts, beliefs evolve together with information set of the consumers, creating a link between information and search decisions. A particular model of learning, such as Bayesian updating, imposes restrictions on the joint variation of information sets and search actions, that are independent of search costs and therefore can be used for identi…cation. The drawback of this approach is that it is both computationally and data intensive: we need to observe the part of the search history up to the point of the search decision. Yet, as we show in our application, even a single conditional search decision can be informative about consumer beliefs, which is helpful, considering how little people search.
We estimate a model of search with learning about distribution of o¤ers, on a unique dataset of search histories by consumers who were looking for hotels in Chicago, in May 2007, at a popular website. Although this website has many di¤erent search tools, in this paper we focus on a particular search strategy: sort hotels by decreasing price and then ‡ip through pages of results, with 15 hotels on each. When the search is over, a consumer can click on a hotel or leave the website. The advantage of our data is rich information about search history: actions, pages of content, clicks. Within a parametric family of beliefs, the model of search from known distribution can be viewed as a nested version of the model with learning, so we can perform a statistical test between the two theories of search. We …nd that the data favors the hypothesis of search with learning, at a high level of signi…cance. The estimated prior belief about conditional price distribution, although has theoretically correct signs, shows less sensitivity to hotel's characteristics than the price regression. This suggests that consumers not only learn, but also may have mean prior belief that's di¤erent from the actual price distribution. The estimated amount of prior uncertainty is small, but statistically signi…cant; at the same time, the degree of Bayesian updating is economically meaningful, as a page of 15 options in a price sorted environment is very informative about the underlying price-quality relationship. We also …nd some decrease in estimated median search cost as we introduce learning, although the di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant.
To our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to introduce learning about distribution of o¤ers into an empirical search model. The existing empirical literature on consumer and labor search, including both simple and experience goods, has relied exclusively on the model of search from known distribution. Two exceptions are Koulayev and Wu (2009) and the recent paper by de los Santos, Hortacsu and Wildenbeest (2009): both estimate a model with learning when consumers hold Dirichlet priors. However, since the search histories are not observed in these applications, the identi…cation power of learning is lost so that the formal test between the two theories of search is not possible. Nevertheless, the former paper provides evidence that a non-sequential search model …ts their data better than the sequential one with learning. They also o¤er an interesting way to compare the two models through their predictions on search costs (see the paper for details). We would also like to mention Mehta et al (2003) who o¤er an identi…cation idea that is similar in the spirit to ours. In their model, consumers are uncertain about intrinsic quality of a brand and learn about it from the consumption experience. At every shopping occasion, they have to decide whether or not to include this brand in their consideration set, based on their experience and search cost (cost of checking the price). Learning creates variation in posterior beliefs about quality across consumers, which allows to separate the variance of prior from the mean search cost 3 . However, the mean prior belief is not identi…ed, because the quality "shocks" that drive beliefs are not observed by the econometrician. Therefore, we believe that our idea of using the joint variation of information sets and search actions to identify beliefs is new.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the data. In section (3), we present the model of search with learning. Section (5) discusses estimation results, and the last section summarizes conclusions and directions for future research.
Data
Consumers are searching for a hotel in Chicago, in May 2007. To begin search, the user submits a search request, which includes city (Chicago), dates of stay, number of guests and number of rooms. On average, a search request results in more than 140 available hotels, which makes it a non-trivial search problem. To navigate among search results, users can just ‡ip through pages, or employ various sorting and …ltering tools, such as sorting by price or …ltering by neighborhood. Each search action ( ‡ipping, sorting, …ltering) results in a display of at most 15 hotel options. As soon as the user …nds a preferred hotel, she can click on it: this website does not sell hotels itself, so the click redirects the user to another website where a booking can be made. This sequence -request, search actions, displays, clicks -comprises what we call a "search history".
For our estimation sample, we have chosen consumers who started their search by sorting hotels in the decreasing order, and then turned at most one page. This leaves us with 1123 unique search histories. These are searches made by anonymous users, and therefore we have no way of connecting searches made by the same person. For this reason, we interpret these histories as made by di¤erent people. The limited amount of search that we model here is primarily explained by the computational complexity of the model.
As mentioned above, a search request on average returns a large number of hotel options. During May 2007, the maximal number 4 of returned hotels was 148; these are Chicago hotels with online pricing. Table ( 2) summarizes these hotels in terms of their quality and location. We do not observe the total availability for each request, we assume that all of 148 hotels are available at the time of request. More precisely, we assume that consumer thinks that all of them are available at the time of search; clearly, this is an approximation, and we try to correct it by including advance purchase in the value of outside option.
For a more complete description of the data, please refer to the companion paper, Koulayev (2009). Here we report only features of the data that are pertinent to the learning phenomenon.
Evidence of learning in the data. Table ( 3) sheds some light on the dynamics of demand, by breaking down clicks for the …rst and the second pages. The question is, when deciding to turn the page, what one should expect? We can see that on the second page, very cheap 1* hotels disappear, cheaper 2* hotels lose their weight in favor of 3* and 4* hotels. Shares of clicks change accordingly, especially notable is the increase in demand for 3* hotels (also some demand for 4* hotels). In terms of neighborhoods, centrally located hotels (Gold Coast, Loop) gain both in the impressions and in the demand. An interesting case is the Southwest (SW) neighborhood: although its share of impressions increases by 5%, the demand drops signi…cantly. This probably means that people willing to stay in that neighborhood are quite price sensitive. In terms of airport neighborhoods, O'Hare is prevalent on the …rst page and Midway on the second, both in terms of impressions and clicks. A similar story goes for distances: hotels that are located far from the center (>10 miles) lose in both terms, and they are replaced by centrally located hotels. In fact, a striking 92% of observations on the …rst page are hotels located far from city center, while demand on the second page belongs in large part to hotels centrally located.
In sum, by turning the page a consumer should expect to see more of higher quality (3-4 stars) hotels, located closer to the city center (by neighborhood or by distance). This is basically a consequence of price sorting. If a consumer is learning, he is using the information on the …rst page to evaluate the pricing of hotels he expects to see later. To this end, Figure  ( 2) compares empirical CDF of prices of hotels close to city center (<5 miles), observed on …rst pages by turners and no-turners, separately. One can see that distribution of prices seen by no-turners clearly dominates, by …rst order stochastic dominance. For turners, the mean price of centrally located hotels is $176, median is $159; for no-turners, these numbers are 198 and 202 dollars, respectively. A similar picture holds for higher quality (>=3 stars) hotels, see Figure ( 3). For turners, the mean price of hotels of better quality is $138; for no-turners, it is 153 dollars. At the same time, there is no such di¤erence for hotels of lower quality and/or located further from the city center, even though they occupy most of the space on the …rst page. Such correlation between prices on the …rst page and page turning can seen as supporting the learning hypothesis: seeing low prices for good hotels, consumers become more optimistic about the bene…t of going to the next page; at the same time, low prices for bad hotels do not a¤ect beliefs because this is not the kind of hotels a consumer expects to see on the second page.
Model
In this search environment, every consumer starts by observing the …rst page of 15 hotel options. At this point, she has three alternatives: a) leave the website without clicking; b) click on a hotel on the …rst page; c) go to the next page of results, which will give her another 15 hotels. In fact, we can merge a) and b) by including an outside option as a "null" hotel, that is always implicitly present on every page. Therefore, she …rst makes a search decision (turn the page), to gather information about available hotels. Although by turning the page she may …nd a better hotel, it is also costly: we assume that every consumer is endowed with a non-zero cost of processing information on the second page (the …rst page is given for free). After that, the decision to click is going to be based on comparing the values of hotel accomodations, including the outside option.
The information about every hotel that is displayed to the consumer includes name of the hotel, brand, price, geographical location, start rating and amenities. Based on these variables, we adopt the following utility speci…cation, consumer i and hotel j:
-where P j is hotel's price (in hundreds of dollars); q j = d j ; s j ; ! n j ; ! b j is a vector of non-price characteristics of hotel j: distance to the city center, star rating, and a set of neighborhood and chain dummies. We take d j = log(1 + D j ) -logarithm of distance (in miles), in order to smooth the outliers, see Figure ( 1). To capture a possible heterogeneity between business and leisure travelers, we allow the price sensitivity to depend on W i -a dummy variable which is equal to one if a person stays over a weekend, and zero if not. . Leaving the website without any click is interpreted as a preference for the outside option, whose utility is:
-where ! R i is a vector of request parameters by consumer i: advance purchase, number of travelers, weekend stay. The utility model gives us a vector of unknown parameters:
Note that the utility speci…cation (1) does not include a constant term. This exclusion restriction is necessary to identify out ; alternatively, we could identify a constant term in (1) and normalize out to zero.
Decision to turn the page
A model of rational search implies that when making a search decision, the consumer takes into account the information she has collected so far. In our case, the relevant information set consists of 15 hotel options observed on the …rst page of results. Since prices are sorted in increasing order, these are the 15 lowest priced hotels among those available. Let u ir = u(p ir ; q ir ; " ir ) -utility of a hotel ranked r, for consumer i; also, let r = 0 correspond to the outside option. From the …rst page of results, the consumer receives the current best utility U 1i = maxfu ir g 15 r=0 , and the information set, i = fp ir ; q ir g 15 r=1 . Note that the information set does not include taste shocks: they are independent of hotel's observable characteristics, and therefore uninformative about the posterior distribution of prices and qualities.
Going to the next page will reveal the next 15 hotels, which will be more expensive, but potentially of better quality. These hotels can be summarized by U 2 = maxfu(p ir ; q ir ; " ir )g 30 r=16 -utility of the best one among them. De…ne F u (U 2 j i ) as consumer's i posterior belief about the distribution of U 2 , conditional on her information set, i . Then, a rational consumer will turn the page if and only if the expected bene…t of doing so exceeds the search cost:
-where c i is a search cost of consumer i. Here we interpret it as a cost of processing information on a page of results. We assume that the logarithm of search costs follows normal distribution with mean and standard deviation (c 0 ; c 1 ), and every consumer receives an i.i.d draw from it. Unknown parameters (c 0 ; c 1 ) are going to be estimated with other parameters of the model. Note that the lower limit of integration is U 1i , since assume search with recall, i.e. the consumer can costlessly go back to the …rst page. We now discuss our assumptions on consumer's beliefs.
Beliefs and learning
A common idea behind various models of search is the extistence of some true data generating process that delivers goods available on the market and hence the outcomes of search. Part of that literature, beginning with Stigler (1967) assumes that the consumer knows this process; the other part, beginning with Rothschild (1974) assumes that the consumer is initially uncertain about the true distribution and learns about it in the Bayesian fashion, as new information arrives during search. In the former case, it is said that "consumer is searching from unknown distribution". In our case, let # (p j ; q j ; " ij ja) be the true distribution from which characteristics of available hotels are generated. We assume that consumer knows the parametric family, but not the true parameter a = a 0 . In this sense, consumers in our model are searching from unknown distribution. This formulation stands in between the two modeling traditions mentioned above, because papers based on Rothschild (1974) typically take non-parametric approach, such as Dirichlet process for the uknown distribution function.
The learning process has a number of steps. Prior to search, the consumer holds a belief G (a) about the unknown parameter a 0 of the joint distribution of hotel's characteristics; we assume that the prior belief is common across consumers. After observing her information set, i , which is a collection of prices and qualities of hotels on the …rst page, she updates this prior in the Bayesian fashion, to arrive at G(aj i ) as her posterior belief about unknown parameter a 0 . This, together with the knowledge of # (p j ; q j ; " ij ja) allows her to …nd the distribution of about prices, qualities and match values of hotels on the second page. In doing so, she takes into account price sorting: prices on the second page are truncated order statistics. Then, using the utility model (1), she can transform her posterior belief from the multi-dimensional space of hotel's attributes into the space of scalar utilities, to obtain F u (U 2 j i ). Below specify the parametric families of (#; G) and the process of updating, but now a couple of comments are in order.
The assumption of common prior is rather strong; however, allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in priors would require additional integration over the likelihood function, which is not feasible with the current method.
Belief structure
Using the chain rule and the assumption of independence of taste shocks, we can re-write # (p j ; q j ; " ij ja) as a product of conditionals:
-where the distribution of match values, f " (" ij ), is Type 1 EV, i.i.d across hotels. The independence assumption implies that taste shocks observed on the …rst page are not going to a¤ect posterior beliefs; this is why information set i , as de…ned above, includes only observable characteristics of hotels. Note that both consumer and econometrician are uncertain about match values of hotels that may appear on the second page: the motivation is that consumer i learns about " ij only when she observes hotel j. On the practical side, this assumption 5 greatly simpli…es computations, to the extent that without it our current approach to estimation would be unfeasible.
We also assume that consumer knows the empirical distribution of non-price characteristics of existing hotels X = fq j g N j=1 :
-where the equality q j = q is satis…ed if all components of vector q j are equal to the corresponding components of a vector q. Here we do not assume that consumer knows the identities of all Chicago hotels, because of the uncertainty about unobserved taste shock, that we discussed above. Instead, she knows the support of distribution of observable qualities and perceives every observed hotel as a random draw from H(q). Also, since we do not observe the actual availability of hotels for each search request, we assume that N = 148 hotels are available for every consumer. These are Chicago hotels that had online pricing in May 2007. Finally, the distribution of logarithm of price p j = ln(P j ), conditional on hotel's quality, belongs to normal family:
-where a = (a 0 ; a 1 ; a 2 ) is unknown parameter. However, the variance log-prices is known and remains …xed during estimation, at 2 0 = 0:35, an estimate from a large dataset of hotel prices. To assess the empirical validity of this assumption, we ran a regression of logarithm of price on distance and star rating, on a large dataset of hotel prices 6 , with error terms clustered on the hotel level. Results are presented in the table below: To test the normality of residuals from this regression, we tried various tests, such as Shapiro-Wilk, Shapiro-Francia, skewness-curtosis, and found that all of them strongly support the null hypothesis. As an illustration, we include normal quantile plot, see Figure ( ??) in the Appendix. We also tested normality of log-prices for every hotel in particular, with the same result.
Using her information set, i , consumer performs Bayesian updating of her beliefs about unknown parameter a and the …rst step is to …nd the likelihood of i , i.e. the joint density of prices and qualities of hotels on the …rst page.
Price densities
From the statistical point of view, prices on the …rst page, p ir , r = 1:::15, are r-th order statistics from the unconditional price distribution, whose density and CDF can be found from (3) and (4): 
(6) 6 To avoid biases due to unequal popularity of hotels, we make a random draw of 1000 price observations for every hotel. This eliminates 11 out of 148 hotels for which we have less than a thousand observations. This is a small portion of the dataset, so results almost do not change.
Our problem, however, is a bit more di¢ cult, because we need to …nd the joint distribution of price order statistics and corresponding qualities, (p ir ; q ir ), r = 1:::15. The following result, which is an adaptation of Lemma 1 from Bhattacharya (1974) is going to be helpful.
Lemma 1 Hotel qualities q i1 ; ::; q i15 are conditionally independent given realized prices, p i1 ; ::; p i15 , with densities H(q ir jp ir ), r = 1; ::; 15. Proof. From our assumption on price distribution in (4), the relationship between price and quality is p j = aq j + j , i N (0; 2 0 ). We can present it as aq j = p j + j , and the same relationship holds for ranked results, aq r = p r + r . Since j are independent of p k , k 6 = j, and mutually independent, the same is true about r . Therefore, when prices are …xed, the joint density of hotel's qualities, aq r = p r + r , is Q H(q r jp r ).
From this lemma, we get joint conditional density of hotel's qualities:
Multiplying (6) and (7), we obtain the likelihood of the …rst page, given parameter a:
For what follows, we need only the part of the likelihood that varies with a and across consumers:
We are now ready to describe the process of Bayesian updating.
Learning
The learning process in our model is not limited to Bayesian updating. In addition to that, we have to account for price sorting, whereby the price distribution should be appropriately truncated; also, our assumption of recall implies that the consumer should not expect to see the same hotel on the …rst and the second page.
The prior belief G(a) about the distribution of unknown vector parameter a is assumed to be normal:
-where covariance matrix 0 is diagonal, with a scalar parameter on the main diagonal. Given information set i , the unnormalized posterior is:
-which is a non-standard density. For the estimation algorithm to be feasible, however, we should be able to draw samples from posterior quickly and easily. Even though methods of drawing from non-standard densities are readily available (e.g., Metropolis Hastings algorithm), for simplicity we approximate the posterior with, again, normal distribution. There are many possible ways to construct such approximation, and one of them is Laplace's method (see Tierney and Kadane (1986)). Laplace's method provides an approximation to the normalizing constant of posterior density, using second order Taylor expansion of the natural logarithm of the density around its mode. This involves …nding the mode and computing hessian at that point; as such, it is a much less expensive task than numerical integration. According to this method, we approximate density G(aj i ) with a Gaussian with the mean and covariance matrix 1i ; H
1i = arg max(log(G(aj i )))
-in other words, the mean of the approximating Gaussian coincides with the mode of true posterior (it is unimodal), and covariance matrix is an inverse of Hessian of that posterior at the mode. Contrary to many other methods, e.g. based on minimizing Kullback-Leibler or Kolmogorov distance, this method is computationally inexpensive and in our case gives good results: we computed Kullback-Leibler distance between exact and approximated posteriors for all consumers in our sample, and found it to be within 1% of own entropy of the exact posterior 7 . Due to price sorting, updating of beliefs involves the second step: conditional price distribution in (4) has to be truncated from below by the maximal price on the …rst page:
Finally, the distribution of hotel's qualities, H(q), is also modi…ed due to the fact that consumer should not expect to see the same hotel on the …rst and the second page:
Therefore, the system of posterior beliefs about prices, qualities and match values of hotels on the second page is described by (8)-(10) and the assumption of EV Type 1 distribution of match values. Together with the model of utility, this implies a distribution of best utility from the second page, F u (U 2 j i ).
Reservation property
Let us return now to the decision rule (2) . For the consumer, the inequality is a deterministic statement: it is either satis…ed or not. For the econometrician, who observes neither …rst-page 7 The Kullback Leibler distance is a mesure of di¤erence between two distributions, P (x) and Q(x). In the case of continuous distributions, DKL = R P (x) log(P (x)=Q(x))dx. For comparison, we've chosen own entropy of the true distribution, P (x), which is E(P ) = R P (x) log(P (x))dx. In this sense, we are comparing to an approximation Q(x) = 1. taste shocks 8 , f" 1 ; ::; " 15 g (and hence U 1i ), nor search cost, this is a probabilistic statement. For a given search cost, this inequality de…nes a set in the space of …rst-page taste shocks; we now show that this set has a particularly simple structure. We …rst notice that the integral in (2) depends on f" 1 ; ::; " 15 g only through U 1i . Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Suppose F u (U 2 j i ) is a continuous distribution function. Then, the inequality (2) as a condition on unobservables f" 1 ; ::; " 15 ; cg can be equivalently written as:
f" 1 ; ::; " 15 ; cg : U 1 (" 1 ; ::; " 15 ) < u(c)
where u(c) :
Proof. Consider the left side of the inequality (2). From our assumption, it is a continuous function, can it can be re-written as:
Here we omit conditioning on 1 for brevity. We are going to vary U 1 by changing only f" 1 ; ::; " 15 g: in this way, F u (U 2 ) will not be a¤ ected. Taking the derivative with respect to U 1 , we obtain:
, which is less than zero provided U 1 < +1. That is, the left side of (2) is a decreasing function of U 1 . At U 1 = 1, its limit is +1, and at U 1 = +1 it is equal to zero; hence, there exists a single crossing point where it is equal to search cost (which is strictly positive).
Remark 3 It would be incorrect to interpret this result as a reservation property of the decision rule, because the content of information set i is …xed. Once we allow it to vary, the monotonicity of the expected bene…t of search with respect to U 1i will generally not hold. In fact, such general result is not needed for estimation purposes, as long as econometrician also knows i .
Likelihood of clicking and turning decisions
For every consumer, we observe two kinds of decisions: …rst, whether or not she turned the page; second, what hotel was booked (including the null hotel). For example, if we observe a consumer who has turned the page and booked a hotel r 2 f0; 1; ::; 30g, then in terms of unobservables this implies two kinds of inequalities:
ir + " ir ir + " ir ; r = 0; 1; ::; 30 -where ir is the mean utility of hotel ranked r on the …rst page, or r 15 on the second page; i0 is mean utility of outside option. Integrating these inequalities with respect to variables unobserved by econometrician gives us the joint probability of two decisions. These variables are match values (or taste shocks), associated with every observed hotel and the search cost parameter. At this point, our assumption about Type 1 EV distribution of taste shocks becomes very helpful, and for a given reservation utility, analytic solution exists to the integration problem (see Appendix A).
Before presenting the likelihood function, let us summarize what is observed on a consumer level. The exogenous variables are i = fp ir ; q ir g 15 r=1 -characteristics of observed hotels on the …rst page, here r -position of a hotel on that page; also, de…ne 2;i = fp ir ; q ir g 30 r=16 be the contents of the second page. Taking the two sets together, de…ne S i = i [ 2;i . Part of this data is missing, because we don't observe 2;i for consumers who didn't turn the page; however, this information is irrelevant for explaining their joint decisions 9 . Clearly, the choice set is de…ned as CS i = i [ 2;i for turners and CS i = i for no-turners. Finally, we have R i -parameters of request, that includes dates of search, dates of stay, number of people and other variables derived from this data.
The endogenous variables are (T i ; C i ), where T i = 0; 1 -page turning decision and C i = 0; 1; ::; #CS i -the position of the clicked option in the choice set CS i , with C i = 0 for no click.
From the de…nition of reservation utility, we obtain:
, where the (vector-valued) function 1 ( i ; 0 ) re ‡ects the learning process, that relates parameters of prior beliefs 0 and data i to parameters of posterior beliefs, 1 .
Proposition 4 Conditional on exogenous variables X i = (S i ; R i ) and search costs, the probability of observing consumer not turning the page and clicking on the result ranked r = h is:
-where F " () is cdf of Type 1 EV distribution. For a consumer who turned the page and then went back to book something from the …rst page (including null hotel):
Similarly, for a consumer who turned the page and booked something from the second page:
Proof. by integration.
Finally, every likelihood contribution has to be integrated with respect to the unobserved search cost. We assume that logarithm of search cost follows normal distribution, with mean and standard deviation (c 0 ; c 1 ). The method of estimation is by maximum likelihood; more precisely, by simulated maximum likelihood, because much of the integration in computing probabilities (13)-(15) is done using simulations.
Identi…cation
As has become standard, coe¢ cients in the mean utility speci…cation are identi…ed from joint variation of clicks and the choice sets from which they are made. Another, less obvious, source of identi…cation of demand parameters comes from joint variation of content of the …rst page and page turning decisions. As we know from the model, it is optimal to search if the best utility from the …rst page is lower than the reservation utility: U 1i < u i . An increase in …rst page prices makes the consumer less satis…ed and hence more willing to search: the predicted probability of page turning increases in a way proportional to price coe¢ cient.
The mean of outside option is identi…ed from the proportion of people who didn't click on anything, and from the restriction that the linear mean utility speci…cation (1) does not have an intercept. The coe¢ cients on parameters of requests are identi…ed from the variation of the shares of no-clickers across consumers with di¤erent combinations of these parameters. Now consider the problem of separation of beliefs and search cost distribution. The extent to which it is possible depends both on data and structural assumptions on distribution of beliefs and search cost. Without the latter, we can rationalize any observed page turning decisions by choosing appropriate cominations of prior beliefs and search costs 10 . Therefore, it is necessary to impose some structure: here we assume common prior belief and common search cost distribution, from which every consumer receives an i.i.d draw.
In general, parameters of prior beliefs and search costs are identi…ed from joint variation of content on the …rst page and turning decisions. The model presents a restriction on this variation, as see from (13)- (15) above. From these equations, we can see that the e¤ect of beliefs and search costs on consumer's decisions 11 is summarized by reservation utility: u( 1 ( i ; 0 ); R i ; c). The "learning" function 1 ( i ; 0 ) emphasizes that the e¤ect of information set i on page turning depends exclusively on 0 , and not the search cost. This function is a weighted "average" of the prior, 0 and the data, where weights depend on the variance of prior, 0 . Therefore, changes in 0 have di¤erential impact on predicted page turning probabilities of consumers, depending on the position of their …rst page data relative to the prior. For example, an increase in 0 makes everybody more pessimistic, but those who observed high prices become relatively more so than those with low prices. In its turn, the variance of prior beliefs determines to extent to which posterior can be a¤ected by data.
On a more intuitive level, one can make the following argument. Suppose there can be only two kinds of pages: with high prices and with low prices. Then take consumers who all have seen the low price page. Given the assumption of common prior, they must have similar posteriors as well. According to the model, they can make di¤erent search decisions if and only if they have di¤erent search costs. In other words, the parameter of search cost distribution is identi…ed from the share of page turners among people who received similar information. Further, observe that if search cost were the only factor, then share of page turners should be the same among those who saw low prices and those who saw high prices. In reality, they are not equal, which can only be explained by the fact that those consumers have di¤erent posteriors. Therefore, parameters of prior beliefs are identi…ed from the variation of page turning activity across di¤erent types of …rst pages.
Note that Bayesian learning is the key mechanism that helps disentangle the e¤ects of beliefs and search cost distribution. It creates variation in posterior beliefs which serves as another source of variation in expected bene…t of search, orthogonal 12 to variation in search costs. Another source of such variation is the non-stationarity of the search problem, where the sampling distribution is changing over time. Here there are two reasons for this: truncation of price distribution due to price sorting; assumption of recall (e.g., I do not expect to see the same hotels on the second page as I saw on the …rst one). See Section (3.2.3) for more details. Thanks to these additional factors, the connection between page turning and content of the …rst page remains. Yet the e¤ect of the recall property is arguably small, considering the large number of hotels; therefore, in the model of search from known distribution the main identifying variable is the truncation price. Table ( 4) suggests that there is a substantial variation in truncation prices, so parameters of beliefs are still identi…ed, but for slightly di¤erent reasons.
Estimation results
We estimate two variants of the search model: with and without learning. In S N L , consumers are assumed to know the true distribution of prices: their mean belief is obtained by regressing log-price on constant, star rating and distance to the city center, on a large dataset of prices. See Table (1) for regression results. In terms of the model outlined in Section 3, we are estimating a restricted version with 0 = (0:35; 0:23; 0:26), = 0. The last restriction is due to the fact that consumers in S N L do not perform Bayesian updating during search. This approach follows the tradition of the preceding literature on product search, where the beliefs structure was …xed at some data-driven level. In this way, we ask a question: given that consumers are extremely rational (e.g., they know true equilibrium), what can we say about their preferences and search costs?
The model S L relaxes this requirement and allows consumers to have some uncertainty about price distribution and learn about it while searching. At the same time, in this model the econometrician does not observe these beliefs, contrary to what we have implicitly assumed in S N L ; therefore, the parameter 0 is now estimated together with other parameters of the model. During the estimation, we make an additional assumption that consumers know the average price of hotel on the market. This implies that 0 2 S where the constrained set is:
-where p = 228:39, an estimate from a large dataset of prices. Table ( 5) presents estimation results from search models, together with standard errors, numerically computed using information matrix. Since these models are nested versions of each other, a likelihood ratio test can be employed to compare their performance. Speci…cally, we test a hypothesis H0: 0 = (0:35; 0:23; 0:26); = 0, against Ha: 0 2 S ; > 0, using likelihood ratio test. In our data, LR=29.77, while 99% quantile of 2 (3) distribution 13 is q 99 = 11:34, which means that the null hypothesis of equal …t is strongly rejected.
To illustrate the quality of …t, in this table we have average deviances of page turning decisions, 2 log(p(T i jX i )), separately for page turners and no-turners: SNL SL turn 2.8079 2.8379 no turn 0.5663 0.5584
As we can see, all search models do much better job at explaining why people don't turn the page than otherwise. This is due to the fact that no-turners take about 75% of the sample. At the same time, the contribution of S L over S N L is mainly about why people do turn the page.
The estimates of search costs are quite similar across models, most likely due to the rationality constraint we imposed. In the basic speci…cation, the mean search cost in S N L is E(c) = exp(c 0 + c 2 1 =2) = 0:38, which can be interpreted in the following way: an average consumer is not going to turn the page if the expected increase in utility is lower than 0.35. In dollar terms, this change in utility can by caused by (0.38/1.00)*100 = 38 dollars of increase in the price of the best hotel from the …rst page. At the same time, there is a high variation of search costs among population.
Turning to the learning component of the model, the variance of the prior in S L is small, but precisely estimated: as we've shown above, the model with learning is stronly preferred by the data. Also, small variance of the prior doesn't mean little learning. Even though the value of prior variance indicates a high con…dence that consumers have in their beliefs, the informativeness of the …rst page -which contains the lowest 15 order statistics from the sample of 148 normal random variables -is also very high. Together with ample price variation on the …rst page, as documented in Section (??), this leads to a meaningful variation in posterior beliefs. On Figure (4) , we illustrate an empirical distribution of average hotel price, predicted by posterior beliefs across consumers. While most of posterior means are between 200 and 250 dollars, some consumers update to as high as 350 dollars. This means that updating of beliefs plays an active role in the identi…cation of the model: we see that the estimated prior has has shifted away from the price regression, its much ‡atter now; also, search cost estimates have somewhat decreased, but perhaps more importantly, their variance decreased as well.
Price elasticities. To evaluate the di¤erence between the two model from a more practical perspective, we compute demand elasticities. For an extended discussion of these and the method of computation, see the companion paper Koulayev (2009) . In short, demand elasticities are obtained by increasing the price of a hotel on the …rst page by 1% and the relevant probabilities before and after the disturbance. The identity of the hotel is …xed both across the models, and across consumers. The change in the demand is computed for every consumer in the sample, and then aggregated over all consumers. For our purposes, we have chosen "Extended stay America", 2 stars, 15 miles from the city center, neighborhood of O'Hare -a typical hotel that often appears on the …rst page. The resulting aggregate elasticities are: for SNL, PE=-0.71% (0.03), for SL, PE=-0.81% (0.10). As we can see, the di¤erence is not that large, in the order of 0.1%, and is explained almost exclusively by di¤erence in parameter estimates (most notably, price coe¢ cient and price beliefs) across the two models. To con…rm this, we have recomputed price elasticities by substituting parameter values from SNL into SL, and obtained virtually the same numbers. Therefore, it seems that the learning component in this search model a¤ects the demand structure only indirectly, through parameter estimates. In the model with learning, we obtain additional degrees of freedom associated with parameters of price beliefs, which are complementary to the price coe¢ cient in explaining conditional search decisions. Indeed, the e¤ect of price beliefs on bene…ts of search is, by de…nition, through the distribution of search results (e.g., utilities of hotels on the second page); on the contrary, the e¤ect of price coe¢ cient is both through the status quo (maximal utility of hotels on the …rst page) and the distribution of second page utilities. Probably more importantly, the parameters of beliefs are responsible only for explaining search decisions, while preferences (price coe¢ cient) attempt to explain both search and purchasing decisions. This may explain why the price coe¢ cient (and then price elasticity) moves to the direction of D2 -the static logit demand model -as we introduce learning.
Conclusions
In this paper we have estimated a model of search for hotels online, where consumers learn about the price-quality relationship while searching. This is the …rst attempt to introduce Bayesian learning about unknown distribution o¤ers into an empirical search model, and …nd an economically signi…cant amount of belief updating, as predicted by the model. We have also argued, albeit only informally, that updating of beliefs can be used for identi…cation purposes: it allows to make an inference about consumer prior beliefs from joint variation of information sets and search decisions. Due to computational di¢ culties, we have limited an estimable part of consumer prior only to two parameters; however, even within this limited exercise, we …nd that estimated beliefs departure signi…cantly from the empirical price distribution, as approximated by price regression. These two …ndings challenge two main assumptions typically made in the models of product search: …rst, that consumer know the distribution they are searching from; second, that their belief coincides with empirical price distribution. This intuition is supported by a statistical test between the two models, which shows that introduction of learning hypothesis and freeing up belief parameters improves the model's …t in a statistically signi…cant way.
Although results are encouraging, this is only a preliminary analysis of the proposed identi…cation method. Several questions remain subject to future research. First, how ‡exible a belief structure can be identi…ed? Clearly, this will depend on "richness" of information sets, relative to the ‡exibility of beliefs. These concepts need to be formalized, and, if possible, an identi…cation theorem proved, at least for some particular cases. Second, consumer level heterogeneity in prior beliefs needs to be introduced. At this point, it is feasible to condition prior beliefs on observable characteristics -in our case, parameters of requests. In future, application of Bayesian methods will make it possible to introduce unobserved heterogeneity as well. Finally, we understand that our test between the two theories of search is limited to the particular parametric family of beliefs that we adopted. We need to test the robustness of this …nding to alternative speci…cations of beliefs, di¤erent in their ‡exibility: beliefs as …nite mixtures; in…nite mixtures; non-parametric beliefs structures (Dirichlet Process). 
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